Dimensionality

Axiology has been described as the philosophical study of which things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and what it means for a thing to be good or bad (Goldthwait 1996, p21; Hirose & Olson 2015, p1). Within axiology, it is noted that two families of value concepts are commonly distinguished: evaluative and deontic. The evaluative family refers to concepts of goodness and badness, and deontic concepts include rightness, wrongness, obligation, requirement, etc (Zimmerman 2015, p13). While both evaluative and deontic concepts of value will be discussed throughout, it should be noted that all evaluative value judgements made hereafter are done so in an attributive manner. This distinction translates as good/bad existing relative to a spectrum of outcomes, states, or criteria. Zimmerman exemplifies this:

“[…] someone may be a good singer but a bad pianist" (2015, p13)

“a good singer […] may be good at singing folk songs but bad at singing opera” (Thomson 1997, cited in Zimmerman 2015, p13)

This qualification of evaluative goodness/badness will be critical going forward, as value judgements made should be noted as existing by comparison – and not existing as predicative (good simpliciter, or absolute goodness) (Zimmerman 2015, p13-14). Equally, value judgements of rightness or wrongness are made relative to a dimension of comparison; for something to be right or wrong, it must be either right or wrong in some dimension i.e., contractually, legally. Within an audio engineering context, to say that a particular microphone ‘sounds good’ is not to say that it is good in a predicative sense, but typically to claim that the microphone in question is subjectively good due to a particular property or set of properties (I.e. sounds warm, sounds clear, etc).

Types and chronology

It is commonplace for axiologists to discuss the notion of intrinsic value (non-dependent on external factors; on its own, as an end) and extrinsic value (dependent on external factors; as a means, or for something else’s sake) (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015, p29). While these concepts can prove insightful, they require careful consideration to ascribe and justify. For instance, some philosophers are sceptical as to whether intrinsic value exists at all. Intrinsic value is said to be “supposedly not a good-of-a-kind” (Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015, p52) but ‘valuable in a vacuum’, and thus should remain valuable regardless of any factors external to the entity or phenomenon itself. I am also moved to great scepticism on this topic. For example, can we truly believe there to be intrinsically good emotions without knowledge or reference to emotions which we know to be undesirable; can pleasure be intrinsically good without comparison to pain or sorrow?

This is, however, a discussion outwith the remit of this research project. To avoid the issue of intrinsic/extrinsic model viability, a different couplet of value concepts will be employed: final and instrumental value. Usage of ‘instrumental value’ will denote value “as a means” (Korsgaard 1983, p170), and ‘final value’ should be translated as “value […] as an end” (Carlson 2015, p286). For instance, eating tasty food provides pleasure. Thus, cooking can be instrumentally valuable (as a means) to pleasure, and pleasure is finally valuable (as an end) – in that pleasure may be considered the ‘end of the chain’. A potential pitfall must be explored however, as Rønnow-Rasmussen recognises:

“if x derives its value from being a means to y, and y derives its value from being a means to z, and so on, we need at some point to put an end to this chain: we need to be able to refer to something that is valuable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else” (2015, p34).

Thus, while I am not seeking to claim that any process which I describe as finally valuable to be categorically valuable for, and only for its own sake, it may be unreasonable to continue identifying instrumental value endlessly.

Integration into the model

There are two functions that the above concepts of value provide within the framework. Firstly, by contextualising whether properties provide instrumental or final value, audio engineering practices can become placed within a chronology of achieving desired outcomes; how to achieve that which is finally valuable. Secondly, to relate evaluations of good/bad to specific dimensions of comparison - to say that things are good or bad not in a predicative sense, but in an evaluative sense. This evaluative context helps to relate value judgements and practice to a spectrum of possible outcomes or states.

Yet, when mapping instrumental and final value, when would final value appear? If final value is, as discussed earlier, value “as an end” then what is the end? As identified by Korsgaard, if “the only option is that the activity is a means to pleasure” (1983, p172), then a similar dichotomy to the viability of intrinsic/extrinsic mentioned earlier arises. As music is largely aimed at being experienced and enjoyed, would the audience’s experience of the music be finally valuable – leading us to believe that all SoAs created by the audio engineer are valuable only as a means for music to provide pleasure? To allow for final value to have more utility than existing as a hedonistic highlight, an additional concept should be included in the framework: distinctions in final value.

Types of final value

As discussed earlier, intrinsic/extrinsic value has been replaced in favour of instrumental/final value distinctions. However, utilising final value (as an end) is not without issue. If final value must not be valuable ‘as a means’, then final value can only exist in scenarios where other value is not dependent upon it. Otherwise, our working definition of final value must be interrogated and adapted. As touched upon earlier, it is recognised that pleasure is often noted as having final value above all else, which has been referred to as a “causal explanation” (Karsgaard 1983, p180) by property of requiring no further justification or explanation beyond ‘pleasure’.

Rønnow-Rasmussen however, identifies that final value may have two varieties, final intrinsic value and final extrinsic value. Final extrinsic value then, is said to apply to things which “are valuable for their own sakes in virtue of at least some of the [entity’s] externally relational properties” (2015, p 32). This variety of final value may allow for something other than pleasure to be finally valuable. We could now view certain properties as having final extrinsic value. For example, less likely to produce feedback could have final extrinsic value if it were to instantiate the property is a property within a HoP at any given moment (thus being desired). Final intrinsic value then will denote value at the (somewhat contested) ‘end of the chain’ (e.g. pleasure).

Following on from this, Figure 14 shows how both final intrinsic value and final extrinsic value could be identified within the earlier trumpet SoA.

Summary

Now that the conceptual framework has been established, and the final model has been reached – a brief recap tying the covered concepts together may be useful.

The ontological concepts of concrete and abstracta allow us to distinguish between sounds, and their instantiated properties – letting us to accurately place value upon the components of, what is often viewed as, a ‘holistic sound’. Concepts from axiology allow for the definition and distinguishing between evaluative and deontic good/bad and help to clarify how we typically attribute goodness/badness; by comparison to the wider range of possible states/outcomes. It may be nonsensical to state that a fork is ‘good’, if only one fork has ever existed. Yet, by being familiar with a range of forks – each with different properties – we can evaluate which forks are ‘good’ in specific dimensions (i.e. utility to lift food, ease of use, etc). So, to claim that a given fork is good, is not to claim it is good simpliciter, but to state that you likely believe it is good within a specific dimension or aspect.

Additionally, subjectivity should be at the heart of discussions of value made within this research. Value within a HoP (and therefore specific placement from top to bottom) is a proclamation of subjective evaluations. HoPs will differ between individuals, will change across time, and can be influenced by external stimuli, etc. With these final clarifications, it should be reiterated that both the HoT and HoP within this framework are relevant and subjective to respective audio engineers alone – this framework is not aimed at creating a universally shared set of tasks and property prioritisations.